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There is virtually no Greek policy towards Turkey outside the
framework of the EU
by Blog Admin
Do Turkey and Greece need the EU to improve their relations? Looking at Athens’ support for
the ‘Europeanisation’ of Turkey, Kyriakos Moumoutzis argues that the Turkey/Greece
relationship is no longer a bilateral one. He writes that the 1999 Helsinki decision to recognise
Turkey as a candidate country, and the rules that the EU has imposed since, have provided the
main framework for relations between the two countries. 
Recently, in a rather optimistic article on this blog James Ker-Lindsay argued that Greco-
Turkish relations are likely to improve regardless of  developments in EU-Turkey relations.
While those who f avour the improvement of  Greco-Turkish relations might f eel tempted to share this
optimistic view, there is a striking contrast between the latter and the logic underlying Greek policy towards
Turkey during the past f if teen years. In f act, there is virtually no Greek policy towards Turkey outside the
f ramework of  EU-Turkey relations. Given the current state of  the latter, substantial improvement in
relations between Greece and Turkey seems unlikely. Optimistic predictions regarding f urther progress are
based on a common misunderstanding of  the belief s and calculations that resulted in the init ial
improvement in relations between the two countries in the late 1990s.
The decision by Greece to ref rain f rom blocking Turkey’s candidacy f or EU membership at the December
1999 European Council summit in Helsinki has indeed been attributed to a belief  that ‘a European Turkey
would be a peacef ul and cooperative neighbour’. This change in Turkish policy will be the outcome of  what
is of ten ref erred to as a process of  ‘Europeanisation’ of  Turkey. This argument indicates a limited
understanding of  the logic underlying the shif t in Greek policy that Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos
Simitis pursued in the second half  of  the 1990s. The Europeanisation of  Turkey as a benef it of  the Helsinki
decision f or Greece was a decidedly secondary consideration. Greek f oreign policy makers were aware of
the f act that it was not certain at all that this benef it would materialise because it was clear that the pursuit
of  EU membership and the process of  Europeanisation would be contested in Turkey. Furthermore, they
understood that the Europeanisation of  Turkey would require a considerable period of  t ime. By contrast,
the Helsinki decision provided that the European Council would assess progress in the resolution of
outstanding disputes by the end of  2004. Finally, Greek f oreign policy makers could not be certain that the
Europeanisation of  Turkey would result in the resolution of  Greco-Turkish problems in a manner consistent
with Greek pref erences, unless the specif ic provisions that Greece had proposed were incorporated in the
Helsinki decision.
If  the Europeanisation of  Turkey was a secondary consideration, what was the main reason why Greece
changed its policy? PM Simitis – and a small group of  Greek f oreign policy makers who shared his views –
believed that the previous policy based on preventing progress in EU-Turkey relations had f ailed. They
believed that Greece should argue that Greco-Turkish problems are not bilateral, but ‘European’ and that it
should allow progress in EU-Turkey relations within a f ramework of  EU rules f or Turkey’s behaviour
towards it. If  Greece could secure such a f ramework, the EU would ensure that its rules were observed.
This is the point where the contrast between James Ker-Lindsay’s optimism in his previous article and the
logic of  Greek policy becomes striking. Hardly anyone in Athens would concede that ‘the Aegean is a strictly
bilateral issue’ and Greece never ‘abandoned its longstanding ef f orts to link improvements in bilateral
relations to Turkey’s EU accession process.’ Greece succeeded in its ef f orts to establish precisely such a
link in Helsinki.
In 2004, the Conservative government did not pursue the implementation of  the Helsinki decision in the
manner in which its Socialist predecessor had intended and it modif ied the rules that the EU’s f ramework
f or its relations with Turkey included. Greek policy, however, remained f irmly embedded in that f ramework.
The Socialists were opposed to these changes and under George Papandreou’s leadership (he succeeded
Simitis in 2004) they argued the need f or a ‘new Helsinki (decision)’ that would restore the original rules.
When they were returned to power in 2009 and bef ore the preoccupation with the economic crisis lef t lit t le
room f or a proactive f oreign policy, they indicated that they would attempt this during the December 2009
European Council summit, although this did not translate into concrete results. Regardless of
disagreements regarding the precise point in t ime at which Greco-Turkish problems should be resolved,
both the Conservatives and the Socialists agree that the successf ul conclusion of  Turkey’s accession
negotiations should be conditional on the resolution of  Greco-Turkish problems.
The 2010 bilateral agreements did not constitute a major innovation and they are not particularly promising
either. In the late 1990s, similar attempts at cooperation in so-called ‘low polit ics’ issues also resulted in a
series of  bilateral agreements and even in the early 1980s attempts were made to explore the possibility of
cooperation in economic issues, despite the f act that the Greek government had terminated negotiations
on territorial issues. None of  these attempts, however, made a posit ive contribution to the resolution of
Greco-Turkish problems. The f ramework of  EU rules that Greece init ially secured in Helsinki is intended to
achieve that. As several EU member-states have grown increasingly sceptical regarding Turkey’s accession
and Turkey has begun to priorit ise ref orms on the basis of  domestic needs rather than EU conditions,
Greek policy is unlikely to be successf ul. EU member-states will be reluctant to ensure Turkey’s compliance
with EU rules on its behaviour towards Greece in order to promote Turkish accession if  they do not f ully
support it and Turkey will be equally reluctant to comply if  it  is not certain that accession is on of f er. Stolen
artef acts might be returned, but given the current state of  EU-Turkey relations, Greco-Turkish relations are
unlikely to improve substantially.
Readers may also be interested in Kyriakos Moumoutzis’ latest book chapter on the role of the EU in the shift
in Greek policy towards Turkey discussed in this article: Moumoutzis, K. (2012) ‘Being Clear Enough to Be
Wrong: Europeanisation Ref uted and Def ended’. In Exadaktylos, T. and Radaelli, C. M. (eds) Research
Design in European Studies: Establishing Causality in Europeanisation (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
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